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Abstract 
 
In a context where 46 countries now consider their fertility rate to be too low, 
attention is turning to the need for policy actions to increase fertility rates. This 
article discusses the reasons why action is required and why countries have been 
slow to take policy action. It then considers a wide range of possible policies and 
assesses them against a set of eleven social policy principles. The policies 
examined include tax-transfer policies, subsidised services, childcare and early 
childhood education, parent leave and working hours policies, employment 
policies for young people, public education campaigns and broader social 
arrangements. The conclusion drawn is that the focus of policy should not be 
pronatalism as such but support for families with children. Support for families 
with children means good family policy, good gender policy, good 
employment/human capital policy, good child development policy and, if there is 
a need to increase or sustain birth rates, it will also mean good birth policy. 
 
1  Introduction: the Need for Policies that Support those 
who have Children 
 
Fertility rates have fallen to low levels that are without precedent especially in 
many countries in continental Europe and East Asia. Survey evidence in most of 
these countries indicates that young people are having fewer children than they 
want to have (van Peer 2002; d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005). I have argued recently 
that this situation is a result of new uncertainties in the lives of young people 
                                                 
∗  Demography & Sociology Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The 
Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia.  
 Email: peter.mcdonald@anu.edu.au 
An Assessment of Policies that Support Having Children 214 
arising from economic deregulation and social liberalisation in the past few 
decades (McDonald 2006). Because of gender inequity, the new uncertainties or 
risks are greater for women than for men, although both are affected. While the 
desire for the intimacy provided by family relationships remains very strong, it is 
easier to deal with the personal and economic risks of modern society if others are 
not affected by the outcome. Governments have played a leading role in the social 
and economic changes that have brought pressure to bear on all forms of altruistic 
behaviour but, most especially, upon family life. Because of this, it is incumbent 
upon governments to restore the balance through family support programs. This is 
the micro-level argument in favour of ‘pronatalist’ policy. 
At the macro-level, sustained low fertility rates have a devastating impact on 
future labour supply at the same time as the number of older people is increasing 
dramatically. If recent demographic trends were to continue, by 2040, the labour 
force in Japan would fall by 20 million workers and by 11 million workers in both 
Italy and Germany (McDonald and Kippen 2001). These losses are entirely losses 
of younger workers and in an era of rapidly changing technology, economies that 
are blasé about their future supply of young technologically skilled workers are 
taking a considerable risk (McDonald and Temple 2006; Skirbekk 2004). Using 
several economic indicators, Ogawa et al. (2005) demonstrate that, in Japan, the 
demographic bonus conferred by the earlier decline in fertility was transformed to 
a ‘demographic onus’ from 2000 onwards due to the impacts on the age structure 
of sustained low fertility. In Europe as well, this message is receiving more 
prominence as very low fertility rates persist for longer periods and as ageing 
societies face the certain knowledge that their social insurance systems are not 
viable in a future with a much older population and a sharply reduced labour 
supply (Commission of the European Communities 2005). 
Thus, it is prudent for countries to try to avoid fertility rates that are below an 
average of 1.5 births per woman through policy regimes that support having 
children. While societies do not necessarily have to aim to achieve replacement 
level fertility, there is a ‘safety zone’ for below replacement fertility that has a 
lower limit above 1.5 births per women. In this safety zone, the effects of low 
fertility on future labour supply can be offset by migration or, alternatively, future 
labour supplies can be allowed to fall at a slow and controlled rate. Countries with 
fertility rates below 1.5 births per woman need to examine the policy directions 
that would lift their fertility into the safety zone. 
The relevant fertility rate for policy is the cross-sectional fertility rate because 
it is this rate that determines the number of births occurring in any given year and 
hence determines the age structure of the population. To wait for a homeostatic 
correction to low fertility or to wait for the effects of changes in the tempo of 
childbearing to work themselves out is risky (McDonald 2006). The much-
awaited correction may never come and, even if it does come eventually, the 
damage to age structure may already have been done.  
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2  Policy Effectiveness 
 
There is considerable evidence that policy can be effective in increasing birth 
rates. At the broadest level, there is a cultural divide between those countries that 
have very low fertility rates (under 1.5 births per woman: all the southern 
European countries, all the German-speaking European countries and all the 
advanced East Asian countries) and countries where fertility is only moderately 
low (all the Nordic countries, all the French and Dutch-speaking European 
countries and all the English-speaking countries). The group of countries with 
fertility rates under 1.5 tend to be countries where there is a separation between 
family and state; families are expected to support their own. Accordingly, these 
countries have been slow to introduce family support policies. In the group with 
only moderately low fertility, governments have a long history of providing 
support to families. At the more specific level, research studies have shown that 
cash payments, child care and family-friendly workplace arrangements have 
supported the birth rate in numerous instances (McDonald 2006). 
Policies must not only be broadly effective, there must also be a political 
acceptance that public resources should be directed towards pronatalist policy. 
Among policy makers, there is increasing recognition of the effects of very low 
fertility rates as described in the previous section, hence, it is not difficult to 
convince them that there is a problem. What is more difficult is to sell the 
message to the general public that the root cause is sustained low fertility and to 
devise policies that will have broad political acceptance. 
In relation to the political acceptance of pronatalist policy, very low fertility is 
often seen as the cumulated outcome of individuals acting in their own interest. 
Accordingly policy would take the form described by Demeny (2003) based on an 
essay published in 1833 by William Foster Lloyd: 
 
Population policy should therefore strive towards institutions and 
incentive systems—a constitution of society—that provides signals to 
individuals guiding them to behave in harmony with the collective 
interest (p. 754). 
 
However, based on survey evidence that many people in advanced countries 
fail to achieve the number of children that they would prefer to have, I have 
argued that there is a need to strive for institutions and support systems—a 
constitution of society—enabling people to have the number of children that they 
already want to have. It is not that people have to be convinced to have children 
but rather that society needs to be structured in ways that enable them to do so. If 
this is indeed the case as I have argued (McDonald 2006), it provides a strong 
ideological basis for the formulation of policies that support births. Such policies 
can be argued on the basis that they not only deal with issues of future labour 
supply (the common future good), but they also improve the well-being of 
individuals here and now by allowing them to fulfil their desire for children. The 
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latter is a stronger foundation for broad-based political support because it can be 
argued, as is frequently done in the Nordic countries, that promotion of births is a 
side effect of policies legitimately designed for the achievement of other desirable 
social or economic objectives, essentially family support policy. 
Despite the cogency of this ‘side effect’ approach, I still believe that the 
importance of policy to support births should be conveyed to the public rather 
than being hidden away. If this can be done in an appropriate way, the argument 
for reform of social and economic institutions becomes much more powerful. 
While there is an element of fiscal risk that pronatalist policies may not work, the 
future fiscal risk of doing nothing in countries with very low fertility rates is far 
greater. 
In the following sections, I discuss the obstacles to policies to support the 
birth rate and then move to a discussion of the principles upon which effective 
policies need to be based. This is followed by an assessment of potential policies 
in relation to these principles. 
 
 
3  Obstacles to Policies to Promote Births 
 
Pronatalism is here defined as government policy aimed at increasing a nation’s 
birth rate. There has been an apparent reluctance on the part of many governments 
to adopt explicit pronatalist policies, although this reluctance is beginning to fade. 
The number of OECD countries that reported to the United Nations that they had 
policies in place to maintain or raise the fertility level remained at seven from 
1976 to 1996. However, the number had risen to 13 by 2003 and more countries 
have announced pronatalist policies since 2003 (d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005: 47). 
Most notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced new policies 
related to increasing the birth rate in his 2006 State of the Nation address (PDR 
2006). The historical reluctance of governments to adopt pronatalist polices has 
many origins as discussed below. 
In relatively recent history, pronatalism was associated with fascist or 
totalitarian regimes. Societies that have removed themselves from these 
influences, often with great pain, are very loath to revisit the past (Lutz et al. 
2003). As a consequence, even the public discussion of the long-term effects of 
low fertility rates is stifled. Also, it is near to impossible in liberal states to get 
new policy directions on the political agenda without prior public discussion. 
Pronatalism has also been associated with eugenicism, the philosophy that it 
is incumbent upon societies to improve the quality of their population through 
selective breeding (Mazumdar 2003; Teitelbaum and Winter 1985, ch. 3). 
Inevitably, if some form of universal pronatalist incentive is instigated, it will be 
denigrated on the basis that ‘the wrong people will have children’. The wrong 
people here are the poor, teenagers and, in some instances, certain ethnic or racial 
groups. The introduction of a large universal maternity payment in Australia in 
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2004 provoked such responses (Editorial, The Australian, 11 May 2004). On the 
other hand, if pronatalist incentives are directed only to the ‘preferred’ people as 
has tended to be the case in Singapore (the rich, the educated, those of the 
preferred ethnicity), pronatalism can be portrayed as being inequitable or racist. 
At a broader level, in a world that has been so focussed upon achieving control 
over rapid population growth through antinatalist policy in poor countries, 
pronatalism in rich countries appears to be, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, 
racist. Poorer countries may react to a situation where wealthy countries are seen 
as promoting family planning in poor countries while promoting more births in 
their own countries. Indeed, pronatalism in wealthy countries has been seen as 
undermining international efforts for the reduction of fertility in those countries 
that still have high fertility. While no longer the case, in general, UN agencies 
were slow to recognise very low fertility as a population issue because they were 
concerned about impacts upon their fertility reduction efforts. 
As Demeny (2003) has observed, modern populations are much more 
sanguine about the prospect of population decline than was the case even 30 years 
ago. Awareness of the impact of humankind upon the natural environment at both 
the global and the local scales is now very powerful. Why would we want more 
births when each additional human contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, 
consumption of scarce resources and to local pollution and overcrowding? There 
is a very sound demographic-economic response to this question (McDonald and 
Kippen 1999, 2001), but the environmental arguments are powerful. 
To the extent that pronatalism is presented as the need for women to do their 
duty for the nation, pronatalism is anti-feminist. Pronatalism in this context is 
portrayed both by proponents and opponents as the bulwark of ‘traditional family 
values’ by which women will return to the role preordained for them by nature 
and by God. While appealing to a minority of conservatives that already see 
themselves as fulfilling their national duty, overall, such a policy approach is 
more likely to be counter-productive leading to even lower fertility. 
Pronatalism can also be seen as an invasion of the rights or the privacy of 
individuals to determine freely the number of children they want to have. The 
objection is raised that ‘the government has no place in the bedroom’. 
Pronatalism necessarily implies a transfer of financial resources or social 
benefits from those who do not have children to those who do have children. 
Those opposed to family support policies on this ground argue that, because the 
decision to have a child is a private choice, those who make this decision should 
bear the costs and consequences of their own decision. 
If there is a problem of too few births, it is a problem of future labour 
shortage. Surely this problem can be solved more efficiently and more humanely 
through international migration? This objection can and has been answered by 
straightforward demographic modelling (United Nations 2000) but the objection 
has popular appeal in ‘left-wing’ segments of the population particularly where 
pronatalism is or is seen to be part of a right-wing agenda. 
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Finally, there is the objection that policies to promote births simply do not 
work and therefore they are a waste of scarce national fiscal resources that would 
be better employed in new productive investment or in education of the children 
that the nation already has. 
In total, these are a very powerful set of objections to any government that 
embarks upon a policy program to promote the nation’s birth rate. They are 
powerful not least of all because they are felt in different form and in different 
degree across the spectrums of society, from liberal to conservative, from rich to 
poor. Each objection has its own specific response but, in the end, pronatalism 
will be ineffective unless a strong and cogent case is presented as to why policies 
to support the birth rate are required at all. 
 
 
4  The Various Faces of Policy to Promote Births 
 
Policy to promote births can come in the form of policies related to the tax-
transfer system, intergenerational transfers, employment, housing, gender equity, 
organisation of the workplace, education and human capital formation, family and 
children’s services, community development and child development policy. We 
seek policies in these domains that reform institutions and provide incentives (or 
remove disincentives) in ways that support childbearing and childrearing while at 
the same time achieving desirable goals within the particular domain. Many 
examples are presented below in the discussion of specific policy initiatives. The 
spread of potential pronatalist policies across a wide array of policy domains also 
gives rise to the potential for incremental reform, that is, elements of a package of 
reforms can be addressed in sequence rather than simultaneously. For fiscal and 
political reasons, grand reform is almost never an option. Incrementalism is 
inevitable. 
The many faces of birth promotion policy imply that such policies involve 
institutional changes that are beneficial to the well-being of individual families 
with children. This is an advantage in that it can be argued that a chosen policy 
regime has a double benefit. The message of a double benefit (to individual 
families and to the nation) has been important in bringing down fertility in 
developing countries. It is even more important in raising fertility from very low 
levels. 
 
 
5  Principles of policy to support the birth rate 
 
Before considering specific policies, consideration needs to be given to the 
principles upon which family support policy should be based in ideal 
circumstances. 
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5.1 The Social Value of Children 
 
The underlying rationale for government involvement in support of families is 
recognition of the social value of children. Fundamentally, children are 
tomorrow’s citizens and tomorrow’s workers. This is the economic value of 
children to society but many also assert that becoming a parent is a right that 
should be protected in all societies and accordingly, social institutions should be 
organised in such a way that this right can be exercised without excessive penalty. 
As this argument applies to all parents irrespective of their circumstances, it 
implies that the principle of horizontal equity should apply to family support 
policy. Horizontal equity means that society recognises the additional costs faced 
by those raising children compared to those not raising children irrespective of 
income level and compensates for this additional cost at least in part. This can 
take the form of cash payments for children, tax rebates or deductions related to 
the care of children or their costs, or subsidised children’s services. It is inevitable 
given public fiscal constraints that most of the cost of children will be borne by 
parents. Societal transfers to those who have children are a partial offset to 
parents for the costs of providing a social benefit. 
 
5.2 Neutrality in Relation to the Working Circumstances of 
Parents 
 
So that the labour market operates efficiently, couples with children need to be 
able to change their working hours without incurring major penalty. For example, 
a financial benefit that is contingent upon the mother not being in paid 
employment will operate as a work disincentive when she wants to return to 
work. A mother who returns to work after some time at home, like all other 
workers, also incurs substantial costs of working such as transport, clothing, 
equipment and additional household expenses, and also incurs child care costs. 
These losses do not have a neutral effect on behaviour, that is, they prevent 
people making the choices that are best for themselves and for their children. 
They fail the efficiency principle at the micro level. Where the disincentives lead 
to withdrawal from employment or to a slower return to employment, the 
country’s human capital, expensively produced, is underutilised, government tax 
revenue is reduced and employers may face skill shortages. This is inefficiency at 
the macro level. To ensure that policies are neutral in regard to the work 
circumstances of the parents, they should be designed as entitlements attached to 
the child and not be added or taken away as either parent changes his or her level 
of work force participation. 
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5.3 Gender Neutrality 
 
While it is overwhelmingly the case in all countries that mothers rather than 
fathers take time out of the work force to care for children, a gender-neutral 
system of benefits means that the rules apply equally in cases where the reverse is 
true. As it becomes more common that the earning potential of the mother 
exceeds the earning potential of the father and as new generations take a more 
enlightened approach to gender equity, more couples are likely to prefer 
arrangements that involve father-care. A gender-neutral system facilitates this 
choice. Paid maternity leave is not gender-neutral, but, in this instance, for a 
period of around three months after birth, there is a health argument that justifies 
discrimination. 
 
5.4 Workplace Benefits: by Negotiation or Legislation? 
 
The starting point for employers is that they should have the right to negotiate 
employment conditions with their workers in line with competition and 
profitability in their industry. They are generally opposed if their rights are taken 
away from them in some way through government legislation. Nevertheless there 
are indisputable areas such as work safety where employers must comply with 
government legislation or regulation. Workplace arrangements such as parental 
leave, family leave, flexible hours of work and access to part-time work are 
generally seen as being ‘family-friendly’ and thus potentially a part of policy that 
is supportive of the birth rate. Thus, the question arises as to whether such 
workplace arrangements should be legislated (imposed upon employers) or left to 
negotiation between employers and workers. 
For reasons of competition and incentive, employers provide larger benefits to 
those with the skills that are in demand. Thus, relying solely upon employers and 
the market will inevitably create social inequities in access to benefits. However, 
because industrial practices differ very substantially across countries, legislation 
of family-friendly workplace arrangements inevitably will be highly dependent 
upon the country concerned, irrespective of principle. Nevertheless, the principle 
is that workplace benefits that form part of a family support policy should, as far 
as possible, be provided to workers equally. 
 
5.5 Child Development Goals should be a Component of 
Policy Formulation 
 
Pronatalist policy should not be seen simply as producing bodies for the industrial 
juggernaut. Such policy should also be seen to be producing human beings who 
are enlightened, educated citizens. Policy does not end with the birth of the child. 
Particularly in relation to the provision or subsidisation of non-parental care or 
education, good child development outcomes should be a component of 
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pronatalist policies. This may involve, for example, supporting only high quality 
child care, not supporting very long child care for infants, providing universal and 
free early childhood education and quality out-of-school hours care. 
 
5.6 A Life Course Approach 
 
A reform agenda should be based on the proposition that families have lifetime 
strategies based on notions of their likely lifetime income streams. Most young 
couples expect to have a relatively reduced income stream when they have very 
young children but they also expect that their income stream will improve again 
as the children get older and the main carer is able to increase her (almost always, 
her) participation in the labour force. To do this, she must maintain her human 
capital or her value to the market place. The accumulation of human capital by 
both men and women, but especially by women, prior to the birth of the first child 
has been the driving force behind the delay of first births. Women when they 
become mothers want to be ensured that, during the period of more intensive care 
of the child, the family income will be adequate and that, after this period, they 
will be able to return to the labour force. This implies intensification of 
government income support in the early years of life of the child. It also means 
that payments and benefits should not be removed as the level of labour force 
attachment increases again because this would constitute a work disincentive. 
The life cycle approach is also relevant at the population level through 
intergenerational accounting. In broad terms, societies fund children and, hence, 
their parents so that the children can become earners who can be taxed to provide 
support for the next generation of children and for their parents’ generation at 
older ages. 
 
5.7 Simplicity and Transparency 
 
It is important that the family support system is simple and transparent. The 
principle here is that people should know their entitlements, they should have a 
simple means of obtaining their entitlement and their entitlement should not 
change with every dollar change in their income, every additional hour that they 
work, or according to a myriad of other terms or conditions. Achievement of this 
aim involves a tax transfer and child benefit system that has largely neutral effects 
as people change their incomes and work force participation. Complexity also 
involves high administration costs—money that would be better placed in the 
hands of parents. A transparent system enables parents to determine their 
entitlements with ease in advance of their decision-making. 
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5.8 The Fiscal Principle 
 
The Finance Ministry’s principle is that any reform must be within the capacity of 
the country to pay and not a fiscal disaster. We can be certain that, ultimately, this 
principle will be imposed upon the reformer. Thus, cost must always be in the 
forefront of consideration. 
 
5.9 The Efficacy Principle 
 
Even more obvious, the proposed reform must be efficacious, that is, there should 
be reason to believe that it will achieve its objectives. As virtually all policies 
directed at the support of a nation’s birth rate have another more direct aim 
(support to families with children), there is scope for risk taking or acting 
somewhat experimentally. The policy can be regarded as efficacious if it achieves 
its more direct aim; if it affects the birth rate, this is a bonus. This also lessens the 
fiscal risk. Nevertheless, in the end, we are seeking policies that will sustain the 
birth rate at moderate levels or raise the birth rate from very low levels, that is, 
policies that work. 
 
5.10  Political Acceptability 
 
It is obvious also that any proposed policy must be broadly acceptable in political 
terms. It is inevitable that governments must engage in public discussion about 
these issues in order to achieve political acceptance. Only about three per cent of 
electors will become parents in any year and the percentage is falling as the 
population ages. Of those who become parents in any year, most would have done 
so without incentives provided by the government. Thus, any policy designed to 
modify behaviour in relation to births in any election year will be directly relevant 
to less than one per cent of electors. The implication from this is that, beyond the 
immediate beneficiaries, governments must convince a broad range of voters that 
children have a social benefit that exceeds the social benefit of any alternative use 
of the same funds. 
 
5.11  The Policy should be Enduring 
 
In the end, policy in relation to births is concerned with changing the nature of 
society such that those who want to have children are able to do so more readily, 
that is, good birth policy is also good family support policy. If the effects of a 
policy disappear relatively fast, while the short-term impact may be beneficial, a 
return to the previous very low fertility circumstance will be undesirable. It may 
even be counter-productive. Thus, policies need to have an enduring influence. 
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6  Should Policies be Specifically Directed at the Timing of 
Births? 
 
Timing is undoubtedly important, however, in general, it is a mistake for policy to 
attempt to be highly specific about the timing of births. For example, a policy 
designed to get women to have a child before the age of 27, besides being 
difficult to specify or implement, ignores the potential response to policy of all 
women currently aged 27 years and over. Only those now aged 25-26 years are 
likely to respond immediately. A broad-based policy, addressed to any woman 
and her partner who might be considering having a baby or another baby will 
have a larger cross-sectional effect simply because it will influence many more 
people at the same time. Nevertheless, policies may vary in the extent to which 
they affect the timing of births. For example, financial support for the education 
of children of parity four or more would probably have little impact on the timing 
of first births. On the other hand, policies that increase the overall sense of 
security of families may be effective in having young people embark upon family 
formation at an earlier point. 
 
 
7  Tax-transfer Policies 
 
7.1 Universal Cash Payment (or Tax Concession) paid at the 
Birth of a Baby 
 
From the perspective of a rapid cross-sectional impact on fertility, a large cash 
transfer or tax rebate that is payable to all parents at the birth of a child is likely to 
be effective because of its immediacy. Several countries or jurisdictions have 
adopted this approach in recent years (Norway, Quebec, Italy, Australia). In 
contrast, any deferred payment, such as tax rebates for the education expenses of 
children, is likely to be discounted by parents. They will have a sense that they 
need the money now, not when the baby turns 15. Such a policy can also be sold 
as a family support policy because it assists parents with the high costs involved 
with a baby. Most costs of children studies show that babies cost more than any 
other age of child up to the time the child reaches the expensive teenage years 
(McDonald 1990). 
In relation to the principles set out above, this policy also scores highly. 
Because of its directness, it strongly affirms that society values children. Being 
paid at the same amount in respect of all babies born, it satisfies the horizontal 
equity criterion. It is neutral in relation to the working circumstances of parents—
there is no loss if either or both parents are working. Being attached to the child’s 
birth, the payment is gender-neutral although there is a question about which 
parent receives the payment or tax concession. It is a common understanding in 
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Australia that cash payments made to the mother are much more likely to be used 
for the expenses of the child than concessions delivered to the father through the 
tax system (Howard 2006). In relation to child development, there are strong 
arguments (breast feeding, bonding, security) that a baby needs to be in the care 
of its mother in the early months of life. As there are a range of preferences and 
beliefs in relation to parental care in the early years of life of a child, a universal 
payment provides parents with choice. For example, the money can be used as 
income support or as a child care contribution while the mother works. Financial 
support of this type can also be provided by paid maternity leave, but paid 
maternity leave may not be universal. It may be paid only to women who have 
been working for the same employer for a given length of time, it may not be paid 
to those who are not working, it may be contingent upon a return to work at a 
time that is not preferred by the parent or the level of payment may be contingent 
upon prior social insurance accumulation. 
There is no policy that is simpler or more transparent than a universal cash 
payment made to the mother at the birth of a child. Political acceptability of this 
policy approach is evident at least for the places in which this policy has been 
introduced in recent years. The introduction of the maternity payment in Australia 
was preceded by two years of intensive public debate about the relative merits of 
different policy approaches. The policy received considerable media coverage 
upon its introduction and while there were some immediate objections that it 
would encourage ‘the wrong people’ to have babies as discussed above, these 
objections faded with time. The government that introduced the policy was re-
elected with an increased majority at an election held six months after the policy 
was announced indicating either that the policy was received positively or, at 
least, that is was not of such importance that people shifted their vote away from 
the government because of it. 
Does such a policy produce more births? In theory, such a payment reduces 
the price of a child and, as children are not inferior goods, this will necessarily 
increase demand. The question is: by how much? The answer depends upon the 
price elasticity and on the size of the payment. In practice, it will be difficult if 
not impossible to know how much money will produce the desired result. 
However, the simple nature of this payment makes it very amenable to upward 
adjustment in relation to the behavioural evidence, that is, experimentation. Also, 
it must be remembered that in low fertility countries, the aim of a birth policy is 
only to influence decision making at the margin. At most, a country with very low 
fertility will be attempting to get about 30 per cent of women to have one child 
that they would otherwise not have had or a country with moderately low fertility 
(1.7 and above) will be trying to convince 10 per cent of women now having a 
child not to change their minds. In general, studies that have been made of this 
type of payment are unanimous that such payments do have a small marginal 
effect (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Milligan 2002; Adkins 2003). Early data on 
the Australian initiative indicate that, in the first full quarter in which births could 
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have been affected by the new payment (June Quarter 2005), there was an 
increase of 10 per cent in the number of births compared to the same quarter in 
the preceding year. 
The downside of a universal cash payment at the birth of every baby is the 
fiscal impact. Marketers would argue that incentives should be targeted only to 
those in whom they are likely to provoke a change in behaviour. The simple 
question can be asked: why provide financial incentives to those who would have 
had the baby in any case? There are several responses to this objection. First, 
those who are providing a social benefit to society at present should not be 
disadvantaged for doing so. Second, it is extremely difficult to identify or define 
the target group, that is, those who will actually change behaviour in response to 
the incentive. Third, as the policy has another purpose, family support policy, it 
cannot be targeted. Fourth, targeted payments, by their nature, operate as 
disincentives if people want to move out of the target group and this is counter to 
the neutrality principle. Fifth, the astute will learn quickly that they need to appear 
to be in the target group of the policy. Sixth, a targeted payment has a high 
likelihood of appearing to be crassly pronatalist. For example, if the payment is 
only directed to women who are ‘high flyers’ in terms of education or income 
because they have low fertility, they are likely to reject the approach as anti-
feminist and other members of society will resent special privilege being provided 
to the already privileged. In any case, the social groups that have the lowest 
fertility rates are likely to have the lowest price elasticity and so the payment 
would be poorly targeted. Policies targeted to the more highly educated or, more 
directly, those with higher incomes have been a failure in Singapore. 
 
7.2 Payments Targeted on Demographic Characteristics 
 
A payment made in respect of a baby is targeted in the sense that it is based on a 
demographic characteristic, a child aged zero. Targeting on the basis of 
demographic characteristics is much less problematic in general than targeting on 
the basis of social or economic characteristics. Payments could, for example, be 
targeted to other ages of children. For example, in Australia, I am arguing for 
higher payments to be made in relation to one- and two-year old children. The 
logic for these payments is the same as that for the payment for babies—
immediacy, horizontal equity, paid at a time of high need, provides parents with 
the opportunity to make their own choices in relation to early childhood 
development and employment. 
Probably the most common form of payment related to children is a family 
allowance or tax concession paid for all dependent children irrespective of their 
age. Sometimes these payments are higher in respect of older children because of 
their higher direct cost. This is effective family policy in that it recognises the 
additional direct costs to families of raising children. As such, family allowances 
probably have a marginal impact upon fertility although the evidence is not 
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strong. The case is made that these allowances have influenced fertility in France 
where very large tax advantages are available to those with children. On the other 
hand, this form of concession meets most of the desirable principles: horizontal 
equity, neutrality in relation to workforce participation and gender, an advantage 
to child development if the money is spent on the child, simplicity and 
transparency and political acceptability. The approach also has a life course 
perspective in that the benefits from government are spread over the lifetime of 
the child. Beyond cost, the only major disadvantage of family allowances 
payments is that future benefits will tend to be discounted by those considering a 
child. Most are concerned with their immediate financial situation. Payments may 
be based upon the birth order of the child. When it is inevitable that reasonably 
large proportions of the population will have no children or one child, there is an 
argument that we need to provide incentives for some people to have three or 
more children, that is, payments should be targeted at higher-order births. The 
effectiveness of this approach is doubtful, however, because a very high 
proportion of children in very low fertility societies are first and second children 
and incentives should be directed at influencing as many births as possible. 
Targeting of third and higher-order births is also less likely to have a large cross-
sectional effect because it would not have much influence upon the age at first 
birth. Ironically, there may be more political opposition to a policy to influence 
only third and higher-order births than a policy to influence all births because 
those opposed to population growth consider large families to be offensive. In 
Singapore, a tax benefit was provided to mothers who had their first birth before 
the age of 27. This was a largely unsuccessful attempt to get high-earning women 
to have their births at an earlier age. The policy was more beneficial to high-
earning women because the maximum tax concession could only have been 
obtained by high income earners. As mentioned above, a payment targeted to a 
narrow age range of mothers will be ineffective because only women currently at 
that age or slightly below it are likely to respond. 
 
7.3 Payments Contingent upon the Workforce Status of the 
Parents 
 
There are also payments that effectively are directed at ‘stay-at-home’ mums. 
Such payments conventionally are tested away rapidly as the second earner’s 
income increases. The theoretical argument in favour of such payments is that, if 
a mother is supported financially to stay at home with the child, she is more likely 
to have the child. However, if she is a mother who wishes to work, such payments 
are inefficient because they operate as a work disincentive. A mother receiving 
this payment who wishes to return to work will face high effective marginal tax 
rates. In combination with other increased expenses related to employment, loss 
of this payment can lock mothers into staying at home. This is anti-feminist, 
wasteful of the nation’s human capital and poor work-family policy. In Australia 
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at present, there is a payment of this type that is available, at its extreme, to a 
woman with one 18 year-old student child irrespective of the income of the 
woman’s partner. The fertility effects of this type of policy are likely to be 
minimal. It can only be justified, as it has been, on the basis of a conservative 
view of women’s role. 
 
 
7.4 Payments Based on Social or Economic Characteristics 
 
Based on the evidence that women of higher education or higher income are less 
likely to have children, payments or benefits may be directed towards these 
women. The political objections to such an approach are very obvious. They can 
be portrayed as eugenic, anti-feminist and distastefully regressive. Without 
changes at the workplace such as reduced working hours, these policies almost 
certainly will not work as evidenced by Singapore’s experiments with this type of 
policy. 
 
 
8  Subsidised Services 
 
Families can be assisted through the provision by government of housing 
subsidies, education assistance, medical and health services, public transport, and 
recreation services. Child care services, because of their importance, are discussed 
in a separate section below. To be pronatalist, those with children have to benefit 
more from the provision of services than those without children. It can be argued 
that any benefit available to all people (including children) will benefit 
households with children more than those without children but this may not be the 
case if consideration is given to the level of assistance relative to need. In most 
countries, provision of general medical and health services will be a greater 
benefit to the aged than to young families. However, forms of health care such as 
maternal and child health, school medical and dental services and free 
immunisation benefit only those with children. Obviously, free or subsidised 
education is directed at those who have children. In relation to housing, first 
homeowner subsidies may have an effect upon the birth rate as may rental 
subsidies or priority access to public housing for those who have children. 
To the extent that services are conditioned by need, as are most health 
services, provision should be based upon need and not upon whether or not 
people have children. Thus, we would expect fertility policy to be directed 
primarily at universal child-related services such as education or maternal and 
child health. However, because these services have their own strong direct 
rationale, their provision may not have a strong or immediate effect upon 
behaviour in relation to births. In a sense, these are benefits that a society is 
expected to provide for all children irrespective of the birth rate—thus their use in 
birth policy would be seen as illegitimate from the political standpoint. The same 
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expectation does not necessarily apply to housing subsidies that are not seen 
generally as being universal entitlements. On the other hand, where there are no 
supply constraints, housing subsidies can be seen as being inefficient in that they 
may distort the operation of the market though increased house prices or rents, or 
through inducement of investment in housing rather than in more productive 
investment. Assistance with housing may well be very effective, however, in 
situations where there is a shortage of housing. 
In summary, subsidised services, other than child care, are probably relatively 
inefficient and ineffective instruments in policy directed at increasing the birth 
rate. However, this conclusion might need to be modified in circumstances where 
severe housing shortages apply. 
 
 
9  Child Care and Early Childhood Education 
 
Research evidence suggests that the exception in relation to the impact of service 
provision upon fertility is the provision of child care or child care subsidies. 
Because child care has not been seen as a universally accepted right in relation to 
children and parents, its provision becomes associated in the public mind with 
assisting parents, especially mothers with young children, in combining work and 
family. The association with fertility is therefore close at hand. It is easily 
recognised as policy that is designed to support the birth rate as well as supporting 
women in the workplace. While couples may not calculate ahead to the cost of the 
tertiary education of their child, they will look ahead a few years at the loss of 
income that they will have if one parent, usually the mother, is out of the work 
force for an extended period of time. In this circumstance, the knowledge that 
affordable, quality child care will be accessible to them when they want to make 
decisions about work and family is very likely indeed to affect their decision 
making. The knowledge that child care will be available reduces the perceived 
risk of having a child and, therefore, is likely to lead to earlier first pregnancies. 
New provision of child care services across a country would therefore be 
expected to have a rapid cross-sectional effect upon fertility. 
On the other hand, as a service, policy changes with respect to child care are 
likely to be incremental rather than revolutionary. Responses are sluggish because 
capital must be found, buildings need to be built, workers have to be trained and 
employed, quality assurance needs to be defined and policed. Also, child care is 
more easily provided in some locations than in others. Child care will be more 
easily provided in child-dense urban suburbs than in remote rural localities. There 
is also considerable variation in the ways that child care services can be assisted 
by government. The care may be provided free and universal and be run by the 
government or it may be entirely provided by the private sector with fee subsidies 
from government. Fee subsidies may be paid to the provider or to the parent and 
they may be income-tested. Alternatively, governments may require employers to 
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provide child care subsidies or to offer them tax incentives to do so. Governments 
may subsidise capital costs rather than fees. However, governments cannot 
legitimately subsidise poor quality care. These many options make child care 
policy either expensive or messy. Accordingly, in most countries, child care 
provision, although eminently desirable, tends to fail the simplicity test. It also 
tends to fail the equity test as it is more available to some than to others because 
of variations in access caused by location, organisation or cost. Despite this, its 
impact upon fertility is so fundamental that efforts to overcome these obstacles 
are crucial. 
Child care as early childhood education is seen as being increasingly 
important to child development especially among children who are deprived in 
some way. Universal and free early childhood education at least from age three is 
a direction that would have widespread political support, evident value to child 
development and, like schools, it would enable parents to more easily combine 
work and family so long as the hours of education were matched to normal work 
hours. This policy approach has been introduced in New Zealand and Canada in 
recent years. 
 
 
10  Leave and Working Hours Policies 
 
As an essential problem related to low fertility is the difficulty of combining work 
and family, this brings workplaces and employers directly into the equation. As 
discussed above in relation to principle, the ideal situation is for workplace 
benefits to be available to all workers equally. Here I refer to such benefits as 
parental leave paid and unpaid, family leave, freedom from excessively long 
hours of work, flexible hours of work, access to part-time work and 
harmonisation of school hours with standard working hours. 
Workplace policies are the third leg of the tripod of family support policy that 
will affect the birth rate, the other two being financial assistance to those with 
children and child care. Workplace policies are vital, but difficult to implement 
because of the involvement of a powerful third party, employers. Unlike the 
general public, it is difficult to convince employers that they should place the 
interests of the nation ahead of the interests of their company. However, in a 
competitive labour market, there can be a domino effect as companies, one after 
the other, provide family-friendly workplace benefits. Those employers that 
provide such benefits may attract the best workers, and their workers may be 
more dedicated to the company because it offers these benefits. Competition then 
induces other companies to do likewise. Governments can set this ball rolling by 
taking the lead in providing family-friendly benefits to their own workers. This 
strategy has worked relatively well in Australia where practices introduced into 
the public sector have filtered into the larger companies. Women in senior 
personnel positions in private companies have grouped together, across 
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companies, to exchange ideas and means by which CEOs can be influenced. This 
has created a culture within workplaces that is counter to the culture of long work 
hours and more accepting of regular part-time employment. In a sense, this is 
private policy implemented beyond government by committed individuals. Where 
it is difficult for governments to legislate for family-friendly workplace 
arrangements, this may be the only way to achieve these changes. Inevitably, 
however, such an approach is discriminatory in that the benefits are only available 
to public-sector employees or those who work for larger companies. Even within 
the larger companies, the availability of benefits is usually greater for the upper 
echelon of workers than for those lower down the structure. 
Paid maternity leave is available in a large number of countries including 
those with very low fertility rates. There is little evidence that, of itself, it has had 
an impact on birth rates. Germany seems to provide a clear instance of a lack of 
impact of paid maternity leave upon fertility. However, to the extent that it 
provides major financial assistance and a guarantee of return to the same job, the 
expectation would be that paid maternity leave should have a positive effect upon 
fertility. Paid maternity leave contributes to child development because it means 
that the baby will be in the principal care of its mother in the first months of life. 
It is simple and transparent and efficient in that it encourages a return to the 
labour force. Experience in Sweden has shown that a considerable cross-sectional 
impact on fertility was obtained through changing the paid maternity leave 
arrangements in such a way that made it beneficial to have two births relatively 
close together (‘speed bonus’). Thus, paid maternity leave policy can influence 
the timing of births. On the other hand, paid maternity leave can have equity 
problems: it may be paid only to women who have been working for the same 
employer for a given length of time; it may not be paid to those who are not 
working; it may be contingent upon a return to work at a time that is not preferred 
by the parent or the level of payment may be contingent upon prior social 
insurance accumulation. 
Paid paternity leave has an impact that is more diffuse. It engages fathers with 
their children, a benefit in most cases to child development, but it also goes some 
way towards the ideal of gender equity in relation to the impact of children upon 
the opportunities of men and women. Similar arguments can be made in respect 
of unpaid parental leave but, of course, the money is important. 
An obstacle to family-friendly workplace arrangements is that they can 
engender resentment among those who do not have children. Workers without 
children can see themselves as doing more work for the same pay. They can even 
see themselves as directly ‘covering’ for the person who has children. This is 
especially the case for the person who comes onto the payroll to replace a woman 
who goes on maternity leave. Such a person is holding his or her position at the 
leisure of the woman on maternity leave. This is another example of why 
promotion of broad social understanding of the importance of supporting those 
with children must be part of a country’s policy. 
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11  Employment Policy for Young People 
 
In general, fertility rates tend to be lower in countries that have recent experience 
of unemployment among young people or recent experience of the introduction of 
short-term work contracts. Delay of the first birth is undoubtedly highly 
associated with risk aversion on the part of young people induced by the 
competitive nature of the labour market in the new economy (McDonald 2006). 
Research has shown that young people who have been successful in obtaining 
secure employment, all else being equal, are more likely to embark upon family 
formation at an earlier age than those who have not been successful (Kravdal 
1994). When risk aversion is an important part of the equation, perceptions 
become more important than reality. In South Korea, for example, the Asian 
financial crisis led to higher unemployment and restructuring of job contracts for 
many young workers, but by no means the majority. Even though unemployment 
fell relatively rapidly after the crisis, the perception has remained that the labour 
market is risky and precarious. With the persistence of this perception, fertility 
continued to plummet. 
In theory, a change in employment policy for young people that reduced these 
perceptions of risk could have an immediate cross-sectional impact upon fertility. 
Longer security of job tenure is clearly the leading area for reform, especially the 
elimination of very short-term contracts. This would be likely to have broad 
political support, but is also likely to be opposed by private employers where such 
practices are common. Again, governments can lead the way as has been the case 
in some countries in relation to family-friendly workplace arrangements. 
Needless to say, a strong economy with low unemployment and good 
prospects for young people will be a stimulus to fertility and to earlier family 
formation. In general, however, these will be the aims of any government and 
would not be seen as being specific pronatalist policies. 
 
 
12  Public Education Campaigns 
 
Campaigns directed at young women to breed in the interests of the nation are 
clearly counter-productive. On the other hand, education relating to understanding 
conception and the risks of waiting too long if you want to have children may be 
valuable. In Australia, there has been a great deal of public discussion in 
newspapers and women’s magazines in relation to the risks of ‘waiting too long’. 
This discussion seems to have served as a public education program and may 
possibly have had a cross-sectional impact on fertility. Fertility rates have risen 
more sharply in recent years at all ages in the thirties. 
Of less obvious efficacy may be campaigns in support of family life or 
allaying unwarranted fears about the future, but these would have to be very 
sensitive in their application. Education campaigns do not cost very much but 
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there may be political objection to governments trying to influence values at this 
personal level. Campaigns of this type are often seen as part of a conservative 
agenda and tend to be rejected by the left. 
 
 
13  Broader Societal Arrangements 
 
There is a wide array of broader social changes that can affect fertility rates. Lutz 
and Skirbekk (2005) have suggested that policy should effect an earlier 
completion of full-time education so that the post-education pathway to family 
formation begins at an earlier age. Several countries in East Asia have considered 
policies that will increase the number of marriages. Access of parents with 
children to leisure and recreation facilities and the provision of child-friendly 
environments have also been suggested. 
 
 
14  Conclusion 
 
Countries with very low fertility rates (under 1.5) have an interest in policies that 
produce a large cross-sectional effect upon the birth rate. Those with fertility rates 
in the safety zone between 1.5 and 2.0 births per woman have an interest in 
sustaining the existing level of fertility. To do this, logically, policy should affect 
the decision making of as many potential mothers as possible at the same time. 
Policies that may do this are the introduction of a large cash payment for each 
new birth, a Swedish-style speed bonus attached to paid maternity leave or an 
education campaign concerning the risks involved for women who delay having 
children when their intention is to have children. A higher level of security 
regarding future access to quality child care at an affordable price or a shift to 
greater security of employment for all workers would also be likely to achieve an 
immediate boost in births but may be more difficult to implement in a short time 
frame. All these policies satisfy most of the principles of good policy approaches 
as described above. However, they need to be subjected also to the principle of 
endurance. 
By the endurance principle, the policy must change society once and for all 
without the possibility of slipping back to a new era of very low fertility. The 
policies described in the previous paragraph all tend to be enduring, however, any 
one of these policies on its own does not constitute a change in the nature of 
society, a radical shift towards the support of those who have children. This can 
only be achieved through a comprehensive approach to policy. A comprehensive 
approach would simultaneously address the financial impact of having children, 
child care and early childhood education and workplace arrangements, the tripod 
of good family support policy. Depending upon the country, it may also involve 
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housing assistance for young couples, a higher level of security of tenure of jobs 
for young people and changes in values regarding the timing of the first birth. 
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